Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57955
Authors: 
Miettinen, Topi
Poutvaara, Panu
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper: Public Choice 3810
Abstract: 
Government or company decisions on whom to hire are mostly delegated to politicians, public sector officials or human resources and procurement managers. Due to anti-corruption laws, agents cannot sell contracts or positions that they are delegated to decide upon. Even if bribing is ruled out, those interested in the spoils may invest in a good relationship with the deciding agents in order to be remembered when the nomination is made. In this paper, we analyze such markets for connections in the presence of convex costs of networking.
Subjects: 
nominations
rent-seeking
networks
politicians
procurement
JEL: 
C79
D52
D72
D85
H57
L14
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
230.74 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.