|
EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57950
|
| | |
| Title: | | The influence of special interests and party activists on electoral competition  |
| Authors: | | Martineau, Nicolas-Guillaume |
| Issue Date: | | 2012 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper: Public Choice 3811 |
| Abstract: | | This paper studies the effects on electoral competition of political parties relying on monetary donations and volunteer labour for their electioneering activities. It also examines whether a recorded decline in party activism increases special-interest influence on party policy platforms. Parties are shown to choose differentiated platforms in equilibrium when activists are present, despite factors drawing them together. Special-interest influence on platforms increases when a decline in activism stems from a fall in their motivation, following parties relying less upon them. This reduces procedural welfare, and potentially reduces voter welfare on policy outcomes, thus calling for more strict electoral laws. |
| Subjects: | | activism special-interest politics political participation collective action electoral competition electoral financing laws welfare |
| JEL: | | D71 D72 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
|
| Files in This Item:
| |
|
| No. of Downloads:
| |
| last Month |
last 3 Month |
total |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57950
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|