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Title:The influence of special interests and party activists on electoral competition PDF Logo
Authors:Martineau, Nicolas-Guillaume
Issue Date:2012
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper: Public Choice 3811
Abstract:This paper studies the effects on electoral competition of political parties relying on monetary donations and volunteer labour for their electioneering activities. It also examines whether a recorded decline in party activism increases special-interest influence on party policy platforms. Parties are shown to choose differentiated platforms in equilibrium when activists are present, despite factors drawing them together. Special-interest influence on platforms increases when a decline in activism stems from a fall in their motivation, following parties relying less upon them. This reduces procedural welfare, and potentially reduces voter welfare on policy outcomes, thus calling for more strict electoral laws.
Subjects:activism
special-interest politics
political participation
collective action
electoral competition
electoral financing laws
welfare
JEL:D71
D72
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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