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Discussion Paper Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies, Deutsche Bundesbank >

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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57783
  

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dc.contributor.authorBerger, Allen N.en_US
dc.contributor.authorKick, Thomasen_US
dc.contributor.authorKoetter, Michaelen_US
dc.contributor.authorSchaeck, Klausen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-03en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-09T10:00:18Z-
dc.date.available2012-05-09T10:00:18Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-86558-787-9en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57783-
dc.description.abstractSocial capital theory predicts individuals establish social ties based on homophily, i.e., affinities for similar others. We exploit a unique sample to analyze how similarities and social ties affect career outcomes in banking based on age, education, gender, and employment history to examine if homophily and connectedness increase the probability that the appointee to an executive board is an outsider (an individual without previous employment at the bank) compared to being an insider. Our results show that homophily based on age and gender raises the chance of the successful candidate being an outsider, whereas similar educational backgrounds reduce the chance that the appointee comes from outside. When we examine performance effects, we find weak evidence that social ties are associated with reduced profitability.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherDeutsche Bundesbank Frankfurt am Mainen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion Paper Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies 2011,18en_US
dc.subject.jelG21en_US
dc.subject.jelG32en_US
dc.subject.jelG34en_US
dc.subject.jelJ16en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordSocial networksen_US
dc.subject.keywordexecutive careersen_US
dc.subject.keywordbankingen_US
dc.subject.keywordcorporate governanceen_US
dc.titleDoes it pay to have friends? Social ties and executive appointments in bankingen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn715112015en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bubdp2:201118-
Appears in Collections:Discussion Paper Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies, Deutsche Bundesbank

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