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dc.contributor.authorvon Lilienfeld-Toal, Ulfen_US
dc.contributor.authorRuenzi, Stefanen_US
dc.description.abstractWe examine the relationship between CEO ownership and stock market performance of S&P 500 (S&P 1500) firms from 1994-2005 (1996-2005). We find that firms in which the CEO holds a considerable share of outstanding stocks outperform the market by up to 16% p.a. after controlling for traditional risk factors like size, book-to-market and momentum. This offers an explanation why so many CEOs hold a large fraction of their own company's stocks. They do so simply because it pays. We also examine several potential explanations why the existence of an owner CEO is not fully priced but leads to abnormal returns.en_US
dc.publisherCentre for Financial Research Cologneen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCFR Working Paper 06-11en_US
dc.subject.keywordAsset Pricing with large shareholdersen_US
dc.titleWhy managers hold shares of their firm: An empirical analysisen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:CFR Working Papers, Centre for Financial Research (CFR), Universität Köln

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