Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/57635 
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dc.contributor.authorNeumärker, Bernharden
dc.contributor.authorPech, Geralden
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-25-
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-26T14:45:34Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-26T14:45:34Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57635-
dc.description.abstractWe characterize equilibria of an income reporting game with bounded returns and no commitment where detected tax evaders are charged the maximally feasible amount. Introducing partial commitment to punishment relief eliminates multiplicity of equilibria. We identify a unique limit equilibrium where the poorest citizens evade, intermediate citizens are honest and the richest citizens are indifferent between evading and truth-telling. For small tax rates and auditing cost, committing to a discretionary punishment relief scheme increases expected tax revenue.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Freiburg, Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economic Policy and Constitutional Economic Theory |cFreiburg i. Br.en
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aThe Constitutional Economics Network Working Papers |x01-2010en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelH26en
dc.subject.jelK42en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordTax evasionen
dc.subject.keywordsignalingen
dc.subject.keywordoptimal punishmenten
dc.titlePenalties in the theory of equilibrium tax evasion: Solving King John's problem-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn699902355en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cenwps:012010en

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