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dc.contributor.authorNeumärker, Bernharden_US
dc.contributor.authorPech, Geralden_US
dc.description.abstractWe characterize equilibria of an income reporting game with bounded returns and no commitment where detected tax evaders are charged the maximally feasible amount. Introducing partial commitment to punishment relief eliminates multiplicity of equilibria. We identify a unique limit equilibrium where the poorest citizens evade, intermediate citizens are honest and the richest citizens are indifferent between evading and truth-telling. For small tax rates and auditing cost, committing to a discretionary punishment relief scheme increases expected tax revenue.en_US
dc.publisherAlbert-Ludwigs-Univ. Freiburg Freiburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesThe Constitutional Economics Network Working Papers 01-2010en_US
dc.subject.keywordTax evasionen_US
dc.subject.keywordoptimal punishmenten_US
dc.titlePenalties in the theory of equilibrium tax evasion: Solving King John's problemen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:The Constitutional Economics Network Working Papers, Universität Freiburg

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