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dc.contributor.authorJoosten, Reinouden_US
dc.contributor.authorMeijboom, Robinen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-31en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-24T15:45:10Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-24T15:45:10Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:gbv:27-20110630-112051-8en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57574-
dc.description.abstractWe introduce a stochastic game in which transition probabilities depend on the history of the play, i.e., the players' past action choices. To solve this new type of game under the limiting average reward criterion, we determine the set of jointly-convergent pure-strategy rewards which can be supported by equilibria involving threats. We examine the following setting for motivational and expository purposes. Each period, two agents exploiting a fishery choose between catching with restraint or without. The fish stock is in either of two states, High or Low, and in the latter each action pair yields lower payoffs. Restraint is harmless to the fish, but it is a dominated strategy in each stage game. Absence of restraint damages the resource, i.e., the less restraint the agents show, the higher the probablities that Low occurs at the next stage of the play. This state may even become absorbing, i.e., transitions to High become impossible.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMax-Planck-Inst. für Ökonomik Jenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPapers on economics and evolution 1024en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC73en_US
dc.subject.jelQ22en_US
dc.subject.jelQ57en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordstochastic gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordendogenous transitionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordlimiting average rewardsen_US
dc.subject.keywordequilibriaen_US
dc.subject.keywordcommon pool resource dilemmaen_US
dc.subject.stwStochastisches Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwAllmenderessourceen_US
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleStochastic games with endogenous transitionsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn644896744en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Papers on Economics and Evolution, MPI für Ökonomik

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