Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57558
Authors: 
Cordes, Christian
Schubert, Christian
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Papers on economics and evolution 1022
Abstract: 
Behavioral (e.g. consumption) patterns of boundedly rational agents can lead these agents into learning dynamics that appear to be wasteful in terms of well-being or welfare. Within settings displaying preference endogeneity, it is however still unclear how to conceptualize well-being. This paper contributes to the discussion by suggesting a formal model of preference learning that can inform the construction of alternative notions of dynamic well-being. Based on the assumption that interacting agents are subject to two biases that make them systematically prefer some cultural variants over others, a procedural notion of well-being can be developed, based on the idea that policy should identify and confine conditions that generate dynamic instability in preference trajectories.
Subjects: 
Social Learning
Preference Change
Welfare
Human Cognition
Consumer Behavior
JEL: 
D63
O12
D11
D83
C61
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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