EconStor >
Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Jena >
Papers on Economics and Evolution, MPI für Ökonomik >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57558
  
Title:Role models that make you unhappy: Light paternalism, social learning and welfare PDF Logo
Authors:Cordes, Christian
Schubert, Christian
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:Papers on economics and evolution 1022
Abstract:Behavioral (e.g. consumption) patterns of boundedly rational agents can lead these agents into learning dynamics that appear to be wasteful in terms of well-being or welfare. Within settings displaying preference endogeneity, it is however still unclear how to conceptualize well-being. This paper contributes to the discussion by suggesting a formal model of preference learning that can inform the construction of alternative notions of dynamic well-being. Based on the assumption that interacting agents are subject to two biases that make them systematically prefer some cultural variants over others, a procedural notion of well-being can be developed, based on the idea that policy should identify and confine conditions that generate dynamic instability in preference trajectories.
Subjects:Social Learning
Preference Change
Welfare
Human Cognition
Consumer Behavior
JEL:D63
O12
D11
D83
C61
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:gbv:27-20110630-110118-0
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Papers on Economics and Evolution, MPI für Ökonomik

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
644896345.pdf185.07 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57558

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.