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dc.contributor.authorRoorda, Berenden
dc.contributor.authorJoosten, Reinouden
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-12-
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-24T15:44:34Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-24T15:44:34Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57555-
dc.description.abstractWe present attractiveness, a refinement criterion for evolutionary equilibria. Equilibria surviving this criterion are robust to small perturbations of the underlying payoff system or the dynamics at hand. Furthermore, certain attractive equilibria are equivalent to others for certain evolutionary dynamics. For instance, each attractive evolutionarily stable strategy is an attractive evolutionarily stable equilibrium for certain barycentric ray-projection dynamics, and vice versa.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPapers on Economics and Evolution |x1117en
dc.subject.jelC62en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC73en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordattractive evolutionary equilibriaen
dc.subject.keywordevolutionary dynamicsen
dc.subject.keywordevolutionaryen
dc.subject.keyworddynamic and structural stabilityen
dc.subject.stwEvolutionäre Spieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleAttractive evolutionary equilibria-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn682892025en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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