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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/57555
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Roorda, Berend | en |
dc.contributor.author | Joosten, Reinoud | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-01-12 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-04-24T15:44:34Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-04-24T15:44:34Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57555 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We present attractiveness, a refinement criterion for evolutionary equilibria. Equilibria surviving this criterion are robust to small perturbations of the underlying payoff system or the dynamics at hand. Furthermore, certain attractive equilibria are equivalent to others for certain evolutionary dynamics. For instance, each attractive evolutionarily stable strategy is an attractive evolutionarily stable equilibrium for certain barycentric ray-projection dynamics, and vice versa. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aMax Planck Institute of Economics |cJena | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aPapers on Economics and Evolution |x1117 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C62 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C73 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | attractive evolutionary equilibria | en |
dc.subject.keyword | evolutionary dynamics | en |
dc.subject.keyword | evolutionary | en |
dc.subject.keyword | dynamic and structural stability | en |
dc.subject.stw | Evolutionäre Spieltheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | en |
dc.subject.stw | Gleichgewicht | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Attractive evolutionary equilibria | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 682892025 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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