Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/57555 
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Papers on Economics and Evolution No. 1117
Publisher: 
Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena
Abstract: 
We present attractiveness, a refinement criterion for evolutionary equilibria. Equilibria surviving this criterion are robust to small perturbations of the underlying payoff system or the dynamics at hand. Furthermore, certain attractive equilibria are equivalent to others for certain evolutionary dynamics. For instance, each attractive evolutionarily stable strategy is an attractive evolutionarily stable equilibrium for certain barycentric ray-projection dynamics, and vice versa.
Subjects: 
attractive evolutionary equilibria
evolutionary dynamics
evolutionary
dynamic and structural stability
JEL: 
C62
C72
C73
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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