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dc.contributor.authorJoosten, Reinouden
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-20-
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-24T15:43:59Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-24T15:43:59Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:gbv:27-20110630-140057-6en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57535-
dc.description.abstractAgents interacting on a body of water choose between technologies to catch fish. One is harmless to the resource, as it allows full recovery; the other yields high immediate catches, but low(er) future catches. Strategic interaction in one objective resource game may induce subjective games in the class of social dilemmas. Which unique subjective game is actually played depends crucially on how the agents discount their future payoffs. We examine equilibrium behavior and its consequences on sustainability of the common-pool resource system under exponential and hyperbolic discounting. A suffcient degree of patience on behalf of the agents may lead to equilibrium behavior averting exhaustion of the resource, though full restraint (both agents choosing the ecologically or environmentally sound technology) is not necessarily achieved. Furthermore, if the degree of patience between agents is suffciently dissimilar, the more patient is exploited by the less patient one in equilibrium. We demonstrate the generalizability of our approach developed throughout the paper. We provide recommendations to reduce the enormous complexity surrounding the general cases.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPapers on Economics and Evolution |x1109en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC73en
dc.subject.jelQ22en
dc.subject.jelQ57en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordstochastic renewable resource gamesen
dc.subject.keywordhyperbolic and exponential discountingen
dc.subject.keywordsocial dilemmasen
dc.subject.keywordsustainabilityen
dc.subject.stwAllmenderessourceen
dc.subject.stwStochastisches Spielen
dc.subject.stwTechnologiewahlen
dc.subject.stwGefangenendilemmaen
dc.subject.stwZeitpräferenzen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleSocial dilemmas, time preferences and technology adoption in a commons problem-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn662456580en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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