Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57535
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dc.contributor.authorJoosten, Reinouden_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-20en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-24T15:43:59Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-24T15:43:59Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:gbv:27-20110630-140057-6en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57535-
dc.description.abstractAgents interacting on a body of water choose between technologies to catch fish. One is harmless to the resource, as it allows full recovery; the other yields high immediate catches, but low(er) future catches. Strategic interaction in one objective resource game may induce subjective games in the class of social dilemmas. Which unique subjective game is actually played depends crucially on how the agents discount their future payoffs. We examine equilibrium behavior and its consequences on sustainability of the common-pool resource system under exponential and hyperbolic discounting. A suffcient degree of patience on behalf of the agents may lead to equilibrium behavior averting exhaustion of the resource, though full restraint (both agents choosing the ecologically or environmentally sound technology) is not necessarily achieved. Furthermore, if the degree of patience between agents is suffciently dissimilar, the more patient is exploited by the less patient one in equilibrium. We demonstrate the generalizability of our approach developed throughout the paper. We provide recommendations to reduce the enormous complexity surrounding the general cases.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aMax-Planck-Inst. für Ökonomik |cJenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPapers on economics and evolution |x1109en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC73en_US
dc.subject.jelQ22en_US
dc.subject.jelQ57en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordstochastic renewable resource gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordhyperbolic and exponential discountingen_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial dilemmasen_US
dc.subject.keywordsustainabilityen_US
dc.subject.stwAllmenderessourceen_US
dc.subject.stwStochastisches Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwTechnologiewahlen_US
dc.subject.stwGefangenendilemmaen_US
dc.subject.stwZeitpräferenzen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleSocial dilemmas, time preferences and technology adoption in a commons problemen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn662456580en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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