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dc.contributor.authorGanuza, Juan Joséen_US
dc.contributor.authorJansen, Josen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-10-15en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-24T11:05:58Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-24T11:05:58Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57521-
dc.description.abstractBy using general information structures and precision criteria based on the dispersion of conditional expectations, we study how oligopolists' information acquisition decisions may change the effects of information sharing on the consumer surplus. Sharing information about individual cost parameters gives the following trade-off in Cournot oligopoly. On the one hand, it decreases the expected consumer surplus for a given information precision, as the literature shows. On the other hand, information sharing increases the firms' incentives to acquire information, and the consumer surplus increases in the precision of the firms' information. Interestingly, the latter effect may dominate the former effect.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010,40en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelL13en_US
dc.subject.jelL40en_US
dc.subject.jelD83en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordoligopolyen_US
dc.subject.keywordinformation acquisitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordinformation sharingen_US
dc.subject.keywordinformation structuresen_US
dc.subject.keywordconsumer surplusen_US
dc.subject.stwOligopolen_US
dc.subject.stwWissenstransferen_US
dc.subject.stwInformationsverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwKonsumentenrenteen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleToo much information sharing? Welfare effects of sharing acquired cost information in oligopolyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn636810267en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
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