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dc.contributor.authorHellwig, Martinen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-21en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-24T11:05:44Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-24T11:05:44Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57513-
dc.description.abstractThis lecture discusses the 2010 crisis of the European Monetary Union and draws some lessons for reform. Crisis resolution has been difficult because the sovereign debt crisis of countries like Greece and Portugal has come together with real-estate and banking crises in countries like Ireland and Spain and bank vulnerability in countries like Germany and France. Failure to disentangle and resolve the different crises prevents a satisfactory approach to the long-term reform of governance of sovereign borrowing and banking. Any such reform must find a substitute for the discipline that exchange rate mechanisms impose on sovereign borrowers and their lenders when the currency is national. Any mechanism for imposing discipline on sovereign borrowers and their lenders must be designed so that enforcement is credible even in a crisis. Recommendations for reform include (i) an inclusion of sovereign exposure from too-big-to-fail concerns in banking in monitoring of fiscal stance, (ii) independence of bank supervisors from their respective political authorities, and (iii) a strengthening of the powers of the European Supervisory Authorities over the national supervisors.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2011,12en_US
dc.subject.jelG28en_US
dc.subject.jelF53en_US
dc.subject.jelF33en_US
dc.subject.jelF36en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordEuropean Monetary Unionen_US
dc.subject.keywordsovereign debt crisisen_US
dc.subject.keywordbank supervisionen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliche Schuldenen_US
dc.subject.stwStaatsbankrotten_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzmarktkriseen_US
dc.subject.stwBankenkriseen_US
dc.subject.stwEuropäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunionen_US
dc.subject.stwEU-Stabilitätspakten_US
dc.subject.stwBankenpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwBankenaufsichten_US
dc.subject.stwEU-Politiken_US
dc.subject.stwEurozoneen_US
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen_US
dc.titleQuo vadis, euroland? European Monetary Union between crisis and reformen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn66251730Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

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