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dc.contributor.authorEngel, Christophen_US
dc.contributor.authorPluta, Alicjaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-12en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-24T11:05:42Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-24T11:05:42Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57512-
dc.description.abstractLegal realists expect prosecutors to be selfish. If they get the defendant convicted, this helps them advance their careers. If the odds of winning on the main charge are low, prosecutors have a second option. They can exploit the ambiguity of legal doctrine and charge the defendant for vaguely defined crimes, like conspiracy. We model the situation as a signalling game and test it experimentally. If we have participants play the naked game, at least a minority plays the game theoretic equilibrium and use the vague rule if a signal indicates that the defendant is guilty. This becomes even slightly more frequent if a misbehaving defendant imposes harm on a third participant. By contrast if we frame the situation as a court case, almost all prosecutors take the signal at face value and knowingly run the risk of loosing in court if the signal was false. Our experimental prosecutors behave like textbook legal idealists, and follow the urge of duty.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2011,14en_US
dc.subject.jelD63en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelK42en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelD03en_US
dc.subject.jelK14en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordrisk aversionen_US
dc.subject.keywordprosecutionen_US
dc.subject.keyworddoctrinal ambiguityen_US
dc.subject.keywordvaguely defined crimesen_US
dc.subject.keyworddutyen_US
dc.subject.keywordDOSPERTen_US
dc.subject.stwJustizen_US
dc.subject.stwRisikoaversionen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhaltensökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleThe people's hired guns? Experimentally testing the inclination of prosecutors to abuse the vague definition of crimesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn66403506Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

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