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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods No. 2011,34
Verlag: 
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
In three party ultimatum games the proposer can first decide whether to exclude one responder, what increases the available pie. The experiments control for intentionality of exclusion and veto power of the third party. We do not find evidence for indirect reciprocity of the remaining responder after exclusion of the other. Similarly, not excluding the second responder is only insignificantly reciprocated by him. Overall, we find little evidence that intentional exclusion affects response behavior.
Schlagwörter: 
experiment
social preferences
exclusion
bargaining
ultimatum game
JEL: 
C91
J52
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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