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| Title: | | Effects of exclusion on social preferences  |
| Authors: | | Fischer, Sven Güth, Werner |
| Issue Date: | | 2011 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2011,34 |
| Abstract: | | In three party ultimatum games the proposer can first decide whether to exclude one responder, what increases the available pie. The experiments control for intentionality of exclusion and veto power of the third party. We do not find evidence for indirect reciprocity of the remaining responder after exclusion of the other. Similarly, not excluding the second responder is only insignificantly reciprocated by him. Overall, we find little evidence that intentional exclusion affects response behavior. |
| Subjects: | | experiment social preferences exclusion bargaining ultimatum game |
| JEL: | | C91 J52 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
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