Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57510
Authors: 
Fischer, Sven
Güth, Werner
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2011,34
Abstract: 
In three party ultimatum games the proposer can first decide whether to exclude one responder, what increases the available pie. The experiments control for intentionality of exclusion and veto power of the third party. We do not find evidence for indirect reciprocity of the remaining responder after exclusion of the other. Similarly, not excluding the second responder is only insignificantly reciprocated by him. Overall, we find little evidence that intentional exclusion affects response behavior.
Subjects: 
experiment
social preferences
exclusion
bargaining
ultimatum game
JEL: 
C91
J52
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
354.09 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.