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Title:The design of licensing contracts: Chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and electrical engineering in imperial Germany PDF Logo
Authors:Burhop, Carsten
Lübbers, Thorsten
Issue Date:2011
Series/Report no.:Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2011,18
Abstract:We investigate a sample of 180 technology licensing contracts closed by German chemical, pharmaceutical, and electrical engineering companies between 1880 and 1913. Our empirical results suggest that strategic behaviour seems to be relevant for the design of licensing contracts, whereas inventor moral hazard and risk aversion of licensor or licensee seem to be irrelevant. Moreover, our results suggest that uncertainty regarding the profitability of licensed technology influenced the design of licensing contracts. More specifically, profit sharing agreements or producer milestones were typically included into licensing contracts.
Subjects:Economic History
Germany
pre-1913
Licensing contracts
Technology transfer
JEL:N83
L14
O32
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

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