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dc.contributor.authorPetersen, Nielsen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-07en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-24T11:05:26Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-24T11:05:26Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57504-
dc.description.abstractMore than one hundred years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court started to refer to social science evidence in its judgments. However, this has not resonated with many constitutional courts outside the United States, in particular in continental Europe. This contribution has a twofold aim. First, it tries to show that legal reasoning in constitutional law is often based on empirical assumptions so that there is a strong need for the use of social sciences. However, constitutional courts often lack the necessary expertise to deal with empirical questions. Therefore, I will discuss three potential strategies to make use of social science evidence. Judges can interpret social facts on their own, they can afford a margin of appreciation to the legislator, or they can defer the question to social science experts. It will be argued that none of these strategies is satisfactory so that courts will have to employ a combination of different strategies. In order to illustrate the argument, I will discuss decisions of different jurisdictions, including the United States, Canada, Germany and South Africa.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2011,22en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordproportionalityen_US
dc.subject.keywordcomparative lawen_US
dc.subject.keywordGermanyen_US
dc.subject.keywordUncertaintyen_US
dc.subject.keywordmargin of appreciationen_US
dc.subject.keywordconstitutional lawen_US
dc.subject.keywordCanadaen_US
dc.subject.keywordSouth Africaen_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial sciencesen_US
dc.subject.keywordempiricismen_US
dc.subject.stwStaatsrechten_US
dc.subject.stwVerfassungsgerichten_US
dc.subject.stwRechtsprechungen_US
dc.subject.stwSozialwissenschaften_US
dc.subject.stwEmpirische Methodeen_US
dc.subject.stwVergleichen_US
dc.subject.stwUSAen_US
dc.subject.stwKanadaen_US
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden_US
dc.subject.stwSüdafrikaen_US
dc.titleAvoiding the common wisdom fallacy: The role of social sciences in constitutional adjudicationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn667821910en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

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