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Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn >
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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57503
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Grechenig, Kristoffel | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Kolmar, Martin | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-10-17 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-04-24T11:05:24Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2012-04-24T11:05:24Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2011 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57503 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | The modern state has monopolized the legitimate use of force. This concept is twofold. First, the state is empowered with enforcement rights; second, the rights of the individuals are (partly) restricted. In a simple model of property rights with appropriation and defense activity, we show that a restriction of private enforcement is beneficial for the property owner, even if there are no economies of scale from public protection. We emphasize the role of the state as a commitment device for a certain level of enforcement. However, commitment will only work if the state can regulate private protection. A ban of private enforcement measures can even be beneficial in situations where there would be no private enforcement at first place because the shadow of defense has a negative impact on the investments in property rights infringements. From a legal perspective, our approach emphasizes a regulation of victim behavior as opposed to the standard approach which focuses on the regulation of criminal behavior. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonn | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2011,24 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | K42 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | P14 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | P37 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | P48 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | N40 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Contests | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Property Rights | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Enforcement | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Private Protection | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Law | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Eigentumsrecht | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Rechtsdurchsetzung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Staatsgewalt | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Kriminalität | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | The state's enforcement monopoly and the private protection of property | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 670048933 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
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