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Title:The state's enforcement monopoly and the private protection of property PDF Logo
Authors:Grechenig, Kristoffel
Kolmar, Martin
Issue Date:2011
Series/Report no.:Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2011,24
Abstract:The modern state has monopolized the legitimate use of force. This concept is twofold. First, the state is empowered with enforcement rights; second, the rights of the individuals are (partly) restricted. In a simple model of property rights with appropriation and defense activity, we show that a restriction of private enforcement is beneficial for the property owner, even if there are no economies of scale from public protection. We emphasize the role of the state as a commitment device for a certain level of enforcement. However, commitment will only work if the state can regulate private protection. A ban of private enforcement measures can even be beneficial in situations where there would be no private enforcement at first place because the shadow of defense has a negative impact on the investments in property rights infringements. From a legal perspective, our approach emphasizes a regulation of victim behavior as opposed to the standard approach which focuses on the regulation of criminal behavior.
Subjects:Contests
Property Rights
Enforcement
Private Protection
Law
JEL:K42
P14
P37
P48
N40
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

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