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dc.contributor.authorHöffler, Felixen_US
dc.contributor.authorKranz, Sebastianen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-09en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-24T11:05:23Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-24T11:05:23Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57502-
dc.description.abstractA fully unbundled, regulated network firm of unknown efficiency level can undertake unobservable effort to increase the likelihood of low downstream prices, e.g., by facilitating downstream competition. To incentivize such effort, the regulator can use an incentive scheme paying transfers to the firm contingent on realized downstream prices. Alternatively, the regulator can propose to the firm to sell the following forward contracts: the firm pays the downstream price to the owners of a contract, but receives the expected value of the contracts when selling them to a competitive financial market. We compare the two regulatory tools with respect to regulatory capture: if the regulator can be bribed to suppress information on the underlying state of the world (the basic probability of high downstream prices, or the type of the firm), optimal regulation uses forward contracts only.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2011,9en_US
dc.subject.jelK23en_US
dc.subject.jelL94en_US
dc.subject.jelL43en_US
dc.subject.jelL51en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordincentive regulationen_US
dc.subject.keywordregulatory captureen_US
dc.subject.keywordvirtual power plantsen_US
dc.subject.stwAnreizregulierungen_US
dc.subject.stwTermingeschäften_US
dc.subject.stwElektrizitätswirtschaften_US
dc.subject.stwLieferanten-Kunden-Beziehungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleUsing forward contracts to reduce regulatory captureen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn661845524en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
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