Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/57499 
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods No. 2010,41
Publisher: 
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Abstract: 
In an influential paper, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) argued that public ownership of banks is associated with lower GDP growth. We show that this relationship does not hold for all countries, but depends on a country's financial development and political institutions. Public ownership is harmful only if a country has low financial development and low institutional quality. The negative impact of public ownership on growth fades quickly as the financial and political system develops. In highly developed countries, we find no or even positive effects. Policy conclusions for individual countries are likely to be misleading if such heterogeneity is ignored.
Subjects: 
public banks
economic growth
financial development
quality of governance
political institutions
JEL: 
G18
G21
O16
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
672.43 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.