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dc.contributor.authorGlöckner, Andreasen_US
dc.contributor.authorEngel, Christophen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-10-15en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-24T11:05:10Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-24T11:05:10Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57496-
dc.description.abstractCriminal procedure is organized as a tournament with predefined roles. We show that assuming the role of a defense counsel or prosecutor leads to role induced bias even if people are highly motivated to give unbiased judgments. In line with parallel constraint satisfaction models for legal decision making, findings indicate that role induced bias is driven by coherence effects (Simon, 2004), that is, systematic information distortions in support of the favored option. These distortions seem to stabilize interpretations, and people do not correct for this bias. Implications for legal procedure are briefly discussed.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010,37en_US
dc.subject.jelD81en_US
dc.subject.jelK42en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelK14en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordparallel constraint satisfactionen_US
dc.subject.keywordintuitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordbiasesen_US
dc.subject.keywordlegal decision makingen_US
dc.subject.stwStrafverfahrenen_US
dc.subject.stwRechtsprechungen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Rolleen_US
dc.subject.stwBiasen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleRole induced bias in court: An experimental analysisen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn636807460en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

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