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dc.contributor.authorEngel, Christophen_US
dc.contributor.authorZhurakhovska, Liliaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-24T11:05:01Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-24T11:05:01Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57493-
dc.description.abstractFrom the perspective of competitors, competition may be modeled as a prisoner's dilemma. Setting the monopoly price is cooperation, undercutting is defection. Jointly, competitors are better off if both are faithful to a cartel. Individually, profit is highest if only the competitor(s) is (are) loyal to the cartel. Yet collusion inflicts harm on the opposite market side and, through the deadweight loss, on society at large. Moreover, almost all legal orders combat cartels. Through the threat with antitrust intervention, gains from cooperation are uncertain. In the field, both qualifications combine. To prevent participants from using their world knowledge about antitrust, we experimentally test them on a neutral matrix game, with either a negative externality on a third participant, uncertainty about gains from cooperation, or both. Uncertainty dampens cooperation, though only slightly. Surprisingly, externalities are immaterial. If we control for beliefs, they even foster cooperation. If we combine both qualifications and do not control for beliefs, we only find an uncertainty effect. If we add beliefs as a control variable, we only find that externalities enhance cooperation, even if gains from collusion are uncertain. Hence the fact that the dilemma of oligopolists is socially embedded matters less than one might have expected.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2011,1en_US
dc.subject.jelD43en_US
dc.subject.jelK21en_US
dc.subject.jelL13en_US
dc.subject.jelL41en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD81en_US
dc.subject.jelK42en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelD62en_US
dc.subject.jelD03en_US
dc.subject.jelH23en_US
dc.subject.jelD22en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordoligopolyen_US
dc.subject.keywordcollusionen_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten_US
dc.subject.keyworduncertaintyen_US
dc.subject.keywordnegative externalitiesen_US
dc.subject.keywordprisoner's dilemmaen_US
dc.subject.stwOligopolen_US
dc.subject.stwKartellen_US
dc.subject.stwRisikoen_US
dc.subject.stwExterner Effekten_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerbsbeschränkungen_US
dc.subject.stwGefangenendilemmaen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleOligopoly as a socially embedded dilemma: An experimenten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn64579418Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
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