Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/57488 
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dc.contributor.authorBade, Sophieen
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-02-
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-24T11:04:53Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-24T11:04:53Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57488-
dc.description.abstractThe paper introduces the assumption of costly information acquisition to the theory of mechanism design for matching allocation problems. It is shown that the assumption of endogenous information acquisition greatly changes some of the cherished results in that theory: in particular, the first-best might not be implementable. Moreover, it might not even be possible to implement the second-best through trade. In addition, the paper highlights the use of randomness in setting incentives for efficient learning. The trade-offs among simultaneous and sequential learning and among efficient learning and efficient allocations are discussed.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2010,46en
dc.subject.jelC78en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordSerial Dictatorshipen
dc.subject.keywordHouse Allocation Problemsen
dc.subject.keywordEndogenous Informationen
dc.subject.stwInformationsbeschaffungen
dc.subject.stwWohnstandorten
dc.subject.stwAllokationen
dc.subject.stwMatchingen
dc.subject.stwMechanism Designen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleMatching allocation problems with endogenous information acquisition-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn640975550en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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