Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57488
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dc.contributor.authorBade, Sophieen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-02en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-24T11:04:53Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-24T11:04:53Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57488-
dc.description.abstractThe paper introduces the assumption of costly information acquisition to the theory of mechanism design for matching allocation problems. It is shown that the assumption of endogenous information acquisition greatly changes some of the cherished results in that theory: in particular, the first-best might not be implementable. Moreover, it might not even be possible to implement the second-best through trade. In addition, the paper highlights the use of randomness in setting incentives for efficient learning. The trade-offs among simultaneous and sequential learning and among efficient learning and efficient allocations are discussed.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2010,46en_US
dc.subject.jelC78en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordSerial Dictatorshipen_US
dc.subject.keywordHouse Allocation Problemsen_US
dc.subject.keywordEndogenous Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwInformationsbeschaffungen_US
dc.subject.stwWohnstandorten_US
dc.subject.stwAllokationen_US
dc.subject.stwMatchingen_US
dc.subject.stwMechanism Designen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleMatching allocation problems with endogenous information acquisitionen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn640975550en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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