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dc.contributor.authorAigner, Rafaelen
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-22-
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-24T11:04:43Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-24T11:04:43Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57482-
dc.description.abstractThis paper shows how the optimal level of Pigouvian taxation is influenced by distributive concerns. With second-best instruments, a higher level of income redistribution calls for a lower level of Pigouvian taxation. More redistributionimplies that tax collection via the income tax creates higher distortions, which in turn makes revenues from Pigouvian taxation more valuable. Contrary to naive intuition, this reduces the optimal level of Pigouvian taxation. The social planner trades off environmental tax revenues against the marginal social damage and accepts a lower tax if the welfare created per dollar is higher. The paper also shows that the relation between levels of redistribution and Pigouvian taxation is reversed in first-best. It thus highlights that second-best Pigouvian taxes are very different from their first-best counterpart - despite apparently identical first order conditions.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2011,17en
dc.subject.jelH21en
dc.subject.jelD62en
dc.subject.jelH23en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordoptimal income taxationen
dc.subject.keywordPigouvian taxationen
dc.subject.keywordcomparative staticsen
dc.subject.keywordexternalitiesen
dc.subject.keywordsecond-besten
dc.subject.stwEinkommensteueren
dc.subject.stwInternalisierung externer Effekteen
dc.subject.stwÖkosteueren
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen
dc.subject.stwEinkommensumverteilungen
dc.subject.stwSecond Besten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleEnvironmental taxation and redistribution concerns-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn664674569en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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