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dc.contributor.authorAigner, Rafaelen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-22en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-24T11:04:43Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-24T11:04:43Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57482-
dc.description.abstractThis paper shows how the optimal level of Pigouvian taxation is influenced by distributive concerns. With second-best instruments, a higher level of income redistribution calls for a lower level of Pigouvian taxation. More redistributionimplies that tax collection via the income tax creates higher distortions, which in turn makes revenues from Pigouvian taxation more valuable. Contrary to naive intuition, this reduces the optimal level of Pigouvian taxation. The social planner trades off environmental tax revenues against the marginal social damage and accepts a lower tax if the welfare created per dollar is higher. The paper also shows that the relation between levels of redistribution and Pigouvian taxation is reversed in first-best. It thus highlights that second-best Pigouvian taxes are very different from their first-best counterpart - despite apparently identical first order conditions.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2011,17en_US
dc.subject.jelH21en_US
dc.subject.jelD62en_US
dc.subject.jelH23en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordoptimal income taxationen_US
dc.subject.keywordPigouvian taxationen_US
dc.subject.keywordcomparative staticsen_US
dc.subject.keywordexternalitiesen_US
dc.subject.keywordsecond-besten_US
dc.subject.stwEinkommensteueren_US
dc.subject.stwInternalisierung externer Effekteen_US
dc.subject.stwÖkosteueren_US
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen_US
dc.subject.stwEinkommensumverteilungen_US
dc.subject.stwSecond Besten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleEnvironmental taxation and redistribution concernsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn664674569en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

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