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dc.contributor.authorCasella, Alessandraen_US
dc.contributor.authorLlorente-Saguer, Aniolen_US
dc.contributor.authorPalfrey, Thomas R.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-24en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-24T11:04:38Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-24T11:04:38Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57479-
dc.description.abstractWe develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue, individuals may buy and sell their votes with each other. We define the concept of ex ante vote-trading equilibrium, and show by construction that an equilibrium exists. The equilibriumwe characterize always results in dictatorship if there is any trade, and the market for votes generates welfare losses, relative to simple majority voting, if the committee is large enough or the distribution of values not very skewed. We test the theoretical implications by implementing a competitive vote market in the laboratory using a continuous open-book multi-unit double auction.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2012,03en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD70en_US
dc.subject.jelP16en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordExperimentsen_US
dc.subject.keywordVotingen_US
dc.subject.keywordMarketsen_US
dc.subject.keywordVote Tradingen_US
dc.subject.keywordCompetitive Equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.stwWahlverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungenen_US
dc.subject.stwAllgemeines Gleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten_US
dc.titleCompetitive equilibrium in markets for votesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn687469368en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
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