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dc.contributor.authorFehr, Dietmaren_US
dc.contributor.authorHeinemann, Franken_US
dc.contributor.authorLlorente-Saguer, Aniolen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-02en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-24T11:04:36Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-24T11:04:36Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57478-
dc.description.abstractWe present an experiment in which extrinsic information (signals) may generate sunspot equilibria. The underlying coordination game has a unique symmetric non-sunspot equilibrium, which is also risk-dominant. Other equilibria can be ordered according to risk dominance. We introduce salient but extrinsic signals on which subjects may condition their actions. By varying the number of signals and the likelihood that different subjects receive the same signal, we measure how strong these signals affect behavior. Sunspot equilibria emerge naturally if there are salient public signals. Highly correlated private signals may also cause sunspot-driven behavior, even though this is no equilibrium. The higher the correlation of signals and the easier they can be aggregated, the more powerful they are in dragging behavior away from the risk-dominant to risk-dominated strategies. Sunspot-driven behavior may lead to welfare losses and exert negative externalities on agents, who do not receive extrinsic signals.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2011,33en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD84en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordstrategic uncertaintyen_US
dc.subject.keywordcoordination gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordsunspot equilibriaen_US
dc.subject.keywordirrelevant informationen_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwKoordinationen_US
dc.subject.stwSunspoten_US
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleThe power of sunspots: An experimental analysisen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn682040819en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
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