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dc.contributor.authorEngel, Christophen_US
dc.contributor.authorZhurakhovska, Liliaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-16en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-24T11:04:34Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-24T11:04:34Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57477-
dc.description.abstractIf two players of a simultaneous symmetric one-shot prisoner's dilemma hold standard prefer-ences, the fact that choosing the cooperative move imposes harm on a passive outsider is imma-terial. Yet if participants hold social preferences, one might think that they are reticent to impose harm on the outsider. This is not what we find, however severe the externality. A within-subjects measure of reticence to impose harm does not explain cooperation. But the externality makes participants more pessimistic. However conditional on their beliefs participants are more, not less cooperative if cooperation entails harm on an outsider, again however severe the externality.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2012,02en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelD03en_US
dc.subject.jelH23en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordexternalityen_US
dc.subject.keywordprisoner's dilemmaen_US
dc.subject.keywordmodified dictator gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordbeliefsen_US
dc.subject.stwGefangenendilemmaen_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwExterner Effekten_US
dc.subject.stwKooperationen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleHarm on an innocent outsider as a lubricant of cooperation: An experimenten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn685539385en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
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