Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57476
Authors: 
Engel, Christoph
Goerg, Sebastian J.
Yu, Gaoneng
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2012,01
Abstract: 
In major legal orders such as UK, the U.S., Germany, and France, bribers and recipients face equally severe criminal sanctions. In contrast, countries like China, Russia, and Japan treat the briber more mildly. Given these differences between symmetric and asymmetric punishment regimes for bribery, one may wonder which punishment strategy is more effective in curbing corruption. For this purpose, we designed and ran a lab experiment in Bonn (Germany) and Shanghai (China) with exactly the same design. The results show that, in both countries, with symmetric punishment recipients are less likely to grant the socially undesirable favor, while bribers are more likely to report to the authorities with asymmetric punishment. In addition, when punishment was asymmetric, corrupt offers were significantly more likely in Shanghai, but not in Bonn. Our results suggest a tradeoff between deterrence and law enforcement. In a forward-looking perspective, lawmakers must decide which aim carries more weight.
Subjects: 
Asymmetry
Punishment
Bribery
Effectiveness
Legislation
JEL: 
D02
K42
C91
D03
K14
D73
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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