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dc.contributor.authorWeinschenk, Philippen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-12en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-24T11:04:30Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-24T11:04:30Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57475-
dc.description.abstractWe study a dynamic model of team production with moral hazard. We show that the players begin to invest effort only shortly before the time limit when the reward for solving the task is shared equally. We explore how the team can design contracts to mitigate this form of procrastination and show that the second-best optimal contract is discriminatory. We investigate how limited liability or the threat of sabotage influences the team's problem. It is further shown that players who earn higher wages can be worse off than teammates with lower wages and that present-biased preferences can mitigate procrastination.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2011,13en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelM52en_US
dc.subject.jelL22en_US
dc.subject.jelJ71en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordmoral hazarden_US
dc.subject.keywordteam productionen_US
dc.subject.keywordpartnershipsen_US
dc.subject.keywordprocrastinationen_US
dc.subject.keywordcontract designen_US
dc.subject.keyworddiscriminationen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsgruppeen_US
dc.subject.stwProjektmanagementen_US
dc.subject.stwZeitkonsistenzen_US
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden_US
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleProcrastination in teams, contract design and discriminationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn66403425Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
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