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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57474
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| Title: | | Mechanism design and voting for public-good provision  |
| Authors: | | Bierbrauer, Felix Hellwig, Martin |
| Issue Date: | | 2011 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2011,31 |
| Abstract: | | We propose a new approach to the normative analysis of public-good provision. In addition to individual incentive compatibility, we impose conditions of robust implementability and coalition proofness. Under these additional conditions, participants' contributions can only depend on the level of public-good provision. For a public good that comes as a single indivisible unit, provision can only depend on the population share of people in favour of provision. Robust implementability and coalition proofness thus provide a foundation for the use of voting mechanisms. The analysis is also extended to a specifi cation with more than two public-good provision levels. |
| Subjects: | | Mechanism Design Public-good provision Large Economy Voting Mechanisms |
| JEL: | | D82 H41 D70 D60 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
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