EconStor >
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn >
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57474
  
Title:Mechanism design and voting for public-good provision PDF Logo
Authors:Bierbrauer, Felix
Hellwig, Martin
Issue Date:2011
Series/Report no.:Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2011,31
Abstract:We propose a new approach to the normative analysis of public-good provision. In addition to individual incentive compatibility, we impose conditions of robust implementability and coalition proofness. Under these additional conditions, participants' contributions can only depend on the level of public-good provision. For a public good that comes as a single indivisible unit, provision can only depend on the population share of people in favour of provision. Robust implementability and coalition proofness thus provide a foundation for the use of voting mechanisms. The analysis is also extended to a specifi cation with more than two public-good provision levels.
Subjects:Mechanism Design
Public-good provision
Large Economy
Voting Mechanisms
JEL:D82
H41
D70
D60
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
682039586.pdf635.46 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57474

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.