Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57473
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dc.contributor.authorHerweg, Fabianen_US
dc.contributor.authorMüller, Danielen_US
dc.contributor.authorWeinschenk, Philippen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-10-15en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-24T11:04:26Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-24T11:04:26Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57473-
dc.description.abstractWe modify the principal-agent model with moral hazard by assuming that the agent is expectation-based loss averse according to Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). The optimal contract is a binary payment scheme even for a rich performance measure, where standard preferences predict a fully contingent contract. The logic is that, due to the stochastic reference point, increasing the number of different wages reduces the agent's expected utility without providing strong additional incentives. Moreover, for diminutive occurrence probabilities for all signals the agent is rewarded with the fixed bonus if his performance exceeds a certain threshold.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2010,38en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelM12en_US
dc.subject.jelM52en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwVergütungssystemen_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden_US
dc.subject.stwRisikoaversionen_US
dc.subject.stwPrinzipal-Agent-Theorieen_US
dc.subject.stwVertragstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleBinary payment schemes: Moral hazard and loss aversionen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn636808076en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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