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Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn >
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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57473
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Herweg, Fabian | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Müller, Daniel | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Weinschenk, Philipp | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-10-15 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-04-24T11:04:26Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2012-04-24T11:04:26Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2010 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57473 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We modify the principal-agent model with moral hazard by assuming that the agent is expectation-based loss averse according to Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). The optimal contract is a binary payment scheme even for a rich performance measure, where standard preferences predict a fully contingent contract. The logic is that, due to the stochastic reference point, increasing the number of different wages reduces the agent's expected utility without providing strong additional incentives. Moreover, for diminutive occurrence probabilities for all signals the agent is rewarded with the fixed bonus if his performance exceeds a certain threshold. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonn | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010,38 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D82 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | M12 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | M52 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Vergütungssystem | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Asymmetrische Information | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Moral Hazard | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Risikoaversion | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Vertragstheorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Binary payment schemes: Moral hazard and loss aversion | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 636808076 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
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