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dc.contributor.authorDoherty, Neil A.en_US
dc.contributor.authorLaux, Christianen_US
dc.contributor.authorMuermann, Alexanderen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-08en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-20T17:09:31Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-20T17:09:31Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-241157-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57366-
dc.description.abstractInsurance contracts are often complex and difficult to verify outside the insurance relation. We show that standard one-period insurance policies with an upper limit and a deductible are the optimal incentive-compatible contracts in a competitive market with repeated interaction. Optimal group insurance policies involve a joint upper limit but individual deductibles and insurance brokers can play a role implementing such contracts for the group of clients. Our model provides new insights and predictions about the determinants of insurance.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCenter for Financial Studies Frankfurt, Mainen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCFS Working Paper 2011/31en_US
dc.subject.jelD68en_US
dc.subject.jelG22en_US
dc.subject.jelL14en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordDeductible Insuranceen_US
dc.subject.keywordUpper Limiten_US
dc.subject.keywordImplicit Insurance Contractsen_US
dc.subject.keywordInsurance Brokersen_US
dc.subject.stwVersicherungsökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen_US
dc.subject.stwSelbstbeteiligungen_US
dc.subject.stwVersicherungsvermittlungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleInsuring non-verifiable lossesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn67942671Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cfswop:201131-
Appears in Collections:CFS Working Paper Series, Universität Frankfurt a. M.

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