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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57292
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| Title: | | Promotion rat race and public policy  |
| Authors: | | Bjertnæs, Geir H. |
| Issue Date: | | 2012 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper: Public Finance 3781 |
| Abstract: | | This study investigates whether excess effort to climb a career ladder justifies policy interventions. The answer depends on whether the government is able to levy a higher tax burden on career workers than on non-career workers. Both a tax on top income aimed at lowering the rewards of promotion and a labour law that restricts excess effort require such a differentiation in the tax burden to improve welfare. The differentiation in tax burden prevents that the welfare gain of reducing excess effort is neutralized by the welfare cost connected to an increase in the number of career workers. |
| Subjects: | | tournaments promotions status taxation |
| JEL: | | H21 H23 L22 J33 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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