EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57292
  
Title:Promotion rat race and public policy PDF Logo
Authors:Bjertnæs, Geir H.
Issue Date:2012
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper: Public Finance 3781
Abstract:This study investigates whether excess effort to climb a career ladder justifies policy interventions. The answer depends on whether the government is able to levy a higher tax burden on career workers than on non-career workers. Both a tax on top income aimed at lowering the rewards of promotion and a labour law that restricts excess effort require such a differentiation in the tax burden to improve welfare. The differentiation in tax burden prevents that the welfare gain of reducing excess effort is neutralized by the welfare cost connected to an increase in the number of career workers.
Subjects:tournaments
promotions
status
taxation
JEL:H21
H23
L22
J33
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
690002734.pdf160.97 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57292

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.