EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57285
  
Title:First impressions matter: Signalling as a source of policy dynamics PDF Logo
Authors:Hansen, Stephen
McMahon, Michael
Issue Date:2012
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper: Monetary Policy and International Finance 3782
Abstract:We first establish that policymakers on the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee choose lower interest rates with experience. We then reject increasing confidence in private information or learning about the structure of the macroeconomy as explanations for this shift. Instead, a model in which voters signal their hawkishness to observers better fits the data. The motivation for signalling is consistent with wanting to control inflation expectations, but not career concerns or pleasing colleagues. There is also no evidence of capture by industry. The paper suggests that policy-motivated reputation building may be important for explaining dynamics in experts' policy choices.
Subjects:signalling
learning
monetary policy
JEL:D78
E52
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
690003471.pdf459.61 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57285

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.