|
EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57285
|
| | |
| Title: | | First impressions matter: Signalling as a source of policy dynamics  |
| Authors: | | Hansen, Stephen McMahon, Michael |
| Issue Date: | | 2012 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper: Monetary Policy and International Finance 3782 |
| Abstract: | | We first establish that policymakers on the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee choose lower interest rates with experience. We then reject increasing confidence in private information or learning about the structure of the macroeconomy as explanations for this shift. Instead, a model in which voters signal their hawkishness to observers better fits the data. The motivation for signalling is consistent with wanting to control inflation expectations, but not career concerns or pleasing colleagues. There is also no evidence of capture by industry. The paper suggests that policy-motivated reputation building may be important for explaining dynamics in experts' policy choices. |
| Subjects: | | signalling learning monetary policy |
| JEL: | | D78 E52 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57285
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|