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dc.contributor.authorHornuf, Larsen_US
dc.contributor.authorVoigt, Stefanen_US
dc.description.abstractThe European Court of Justice (ECJ) is a very powerful court compared to other international courts and even national courts of last resort. Observers almost unanimously agree that it is the preliminary references procedure that made the ECJ the powerful court it is today. In this paper, we analyze the determinants that lead national courts to use the procedure. We add to previous studies by constructing a comprehensive panel dataset (1982-2008), including more potentially relevant explanatory variables and by testing for the robustness of previous results. In addition to confirming the relevance of variables previously found significant, we identify a number of additional determinants, including the relevance of agriculture to a country, corporate tax rate, familiarity with EU law, and tenure of democracy.en_US
dc.publisherCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) Munichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper: Public Choice 3769en_US
dc.subject.keywordEuropean Court of Justiceen_US
dc.subject.keywordeconomic analysis of court behavioren_US
dc.subject.keywordpreliminary reference procedureen_US
dc.titlePreliminary references: Analyzing the determinants that made the ECJ the powerful court it isen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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