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dc.contributor.authorEichner, Thomasen_US
dc.contributor.authorPethig, Rüdigeren_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-02-15en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-18T14:54:25Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-18T14:54:25Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57263-
dc.description.abstractInternalizing the global negative externality of carbon emissions requires flattening the extraction path of world fossil energy resources (= world carbon emissions). We consider governments having sign-unconstrained emission taxes at their disposal and seeking to prevent world emissions from exceeding some binding aggregate emission ceiling in the medium term. Such a ceiling policy can be carried out either in full cooperation of all (major) carbon emitting countries or by a sub-global climate coalition. Unilateral action has to cope with carbon leakage and high costs which makes a strong case for choosing a policy that implements the ceiling in a cost-effective way. In a two-country two-period general equilibrium model with a non-renewable fossil-energy resource we characterize the unilateral cost-effective ceiling policy and compare it with its fully cooperative counterpart. We show that with full cooperation there exists a cost-effective ceiling policy in which only first-period emissions are taxed at a rate that is uniform across countries. In contrast, the cost-effective ceiling policy of a sub-global climate coalition is characterized by emission regulation in both periods. That policy may consist either of positive tax rates in both periods or of negative tax rates (= subsidies) in both periods or of a positive rate in the first and a negative rate in the second period. The share of the total stock of energy resources owned by the sub-global climate coalition turns out to be a decisive determinant of the sign and magnitude of unilateral cost-effective taxes.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherSiegen , Univ., Fakultät III, Wirtschaftswiss., Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrechten_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesVolkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge, Universität Siegen, Fakultät III: Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht 151-11en_US
dc.subject.jelH22en_US
dc.subject.jelQ32en_US
dc.subject.jelQ54en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordunilateral climate policyen_US
dc.subject.keywordintertemporal climate policyen_US
dc.subject.keywordnon-renewable energy resourcesen_US
dc.subject.keywordemission taxesen_US
dc.subject.stwKlimaschutzen_US
dc.subject.stwInternationale Umweltpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwKohlendioxiden_US
dc.subject.stwIntertemporale Allokationen_US
dc.subject.stwÖkosteueren_US
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleFlattening the carbon extraction path in unilateral costeffective actionen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn685359581en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
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