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Fakultät III: Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht, Universität Siegen >
Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge, Universität Siegen >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57263
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Eichner, Thomas | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Pethig, Rüdiger | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-02-15 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-04-18T14:54:25Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2012-04-18T14:54:25Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2011 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57263 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | Internalizing the global negative externality of carbon emissions requires flattening the extraction path of world fossil energy resources (= world carbon emissions). We consider governments having sign-unconstrained emission taxes at their disposal and seeking to prevent world emissions from exceeding some binding aggregate emission ceiling in the medium term. Such a ceiling policy can be carried out either in full cooperation of all (major) carbon emitting countries or by a sub-global climate coalition. Unilateral action has to cope with carbon leakage and high costs which makes a strong case for choosing a policy that implements the ceiling in a cost-effective way. In a two-country two-period general equilibrium model with a non-renewable fossil-energy resource we characterize the unilateral cost-effective ceiling policy and compare it with its fully cooperative counterpart. We show that with full cooperation there exists a cost-effective ceiling policy in which only first-period emissions are taxed at a rate that is uniform across countries. In contrast, the cost-effective ceiling policy of a sub-global climate coalition is characterized by emission regulation in both periods. That policy may consist either of positive tax rates in both periods or of negative tax rates (= subsidies) in both periods or of a positive rate in the first and a negative rate in the second period. The share of the total stock of energy resources owned by the sub-global climate coalition turns out to be a decisive determinant of the sign and magnitude of unilateral cost-effective taxes. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Siegen , Univ., Fakultät III, Wirtschaftswiss., Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge, Universität Siegen, Fakultät III: Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht 151-11 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H22 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | Q32 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | Q54 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | unilateral climate policy | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | intertemporal climate policy | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | non-renewable energy resources | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | emission taxes | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Klimaschutz | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Internationale Umweltpolitik | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Kohlendioxid | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Intertemporale Allokation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Ökosteuer | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Optimale Besteuerung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Flattening the carbon extraction path in unilateral costeffective action | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 685359581 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge, Universität Siegen
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