Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/57263 
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dc.contributor.authorEichner, Thomasen
dc.contributor.authorPethig, Rüdigeren
dc.date.accessioned2011-02-15-
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-18T14:54:25Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-18T14:54:25Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57263-
dc.description.abstractInternalizing the global negative externality of carbon emissions requires flattening the extraction path of world fossil energy resources (= world carbon emissions). We consider governments having sign-unconstrained emission taxes at their disposal and seeking to prevent world emissions from exceeding some binding aggregate emission ceiling in the medium term. Such a ceiling policy can be carried out either in full cooperation of all (major) carbon emitting countries or by a sub-global climate coalition. Unilateral action has to cope with carbon leakage and high costs which makes a strong case for choosing a policy that implements the ceiling in a cost-effective way. In a two-country two-period general equilibrium model with a non-renewable fossil-energy resource we characterize the unilateral cost-effective ceiling policy and compare it with its fully cooperative counterpart. We show that with full cooperation there exists a cost-effective ceiling policy in which only first-period emissions are taxed at a rate that is uniform across countries. In contrast, the cost-effective ceiling policy of a sub-global climate coalition is characterized by emission regulation in both periods. That policy may consist either of positive tax rates in both periods or of negative tax rates (= subsidies) in both periods or of a positive rate in the first and a negative rate in the second period. The share of the total stock of energy resources owned by the sub-global climate coalition turns out to be a decisive determinant of the sign and magnitude of unilateral cost-effective taxes.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversität Siegen, Fakultät III, Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht |cSiegenen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aVolkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge |x151-11en
dc.subject.jelH22en
dc.subject.jelQ32en
dc.subject.jelQ54en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordunilateral climate policyen
dc.subject.keywordintertemporal climate policyen
dc.subject.keywordnon-renewable energy resourcesen
dc.subject.keywordemission taxesen
dc.subject.stwKlimaschutzen
dc.subject.stwInternationale Umweltpolitiken
dc.subject.stwKohlendioxiden
dc.subject.stwIntertemporale Allokationen
dc.subject.stwÖkosteueren
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleFlattening the carbon extraction path in unilateral costeffective action-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn685359581en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:sie:siegen:151-11en

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