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Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge, Universität Siegen >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57260
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Popkova, Katherina | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-11-09 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-04-18T14:54:17Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2012-04-18T14:54:17Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2011 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57260 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | This paper analyses the influence of the exchange rate regime of a country on the level of tolerated corruption with a special focus on the interdependency of monetary and fiscal policies. Using a simple theoretical framework based on Barro-Gordon-Model I compare independent monetary policy with a tight peg arrangement in order to find out which regime is more likely to induce governments to intensify the fight against corruption. It is shown that if corruption has a considerable positive impact on output, a tight peg regime can increase tolerated corruption. However, if corruption has a negative effect on output, a pegged exchange rate regime will lead to a lower level of tolerated corruption. The issue of particular interest appears to be the finding that a strong positive impact of corruption on output can induce governments to choose a pegging regime while a weak positive impact of corruption (and a negative influence of corruption even more) provides an incentive to keep monetary independence. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Siegen , Univ., Fakultät III, Wirtschaftswiss., Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge, Universität Siegen, Fakultät III: Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht 148-11 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | E52 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | E58 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | E61 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | E63 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | F33 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Exchange Rate Regime | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Monetary Policy | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Fiscal Policy | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Corruption | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Wechselkurssystem | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Korruption | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Stufenflexibilität | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Korruptionsbekämpfung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Can the exchange rate regime influence corruption? | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 671799355 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge, Universität Siegen
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