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dc.contributor.authorPopkova, Katherinaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-09en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-18T14:54:17Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-18T14:54:17Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57260-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyses the influence of the exchange rate regime of a country on the level of tolerated corruption with a special focus on the interdependency of monetary and fiscal policies. Using a simple theoretical framework based on Barro-Gordon-Model I compare independent monetary policy with a tight peg arrangement in order to find out which regime is more likely to induce governments to intensify the fight against corruption. It is shown that if corruption has a considerable positive impact on output, a tight peg regime can increase tolerated corruption. However, if corruption has a negative effect on output, a pegged exchange rate regime will lead to a lower level of tolerated corruption. The issue of particular interest appears to be the finding that a strong positive impact of corruption on output can induce governments to choose a pegging regime while a weak positive impact of corruption (and a negative influence of corruption even more) provides an incentive to keep monetary independence.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherSiegen , Univ., Fakultät III, Wirtschaftswiss., Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrechten_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesVolkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge, Universität Siegen, Fakultät III: Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht 148-11en_US
dc.subject.jelE52en_US
dc.subject.jelE58en_US
dc.subject.jelE61en_US
dc.subject.jelE63en_US
dc.subject.jelF33en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordExchange Rate Regimeen_US
dc.subject.keywordMonetary Policyen_US
dc.subject.keywordFiscal Policyen_US
dc.subject.keywordCorruptionen_US
dc.subject.stwWechselkurssystemen_US
dc.subject.stwKorruptionen_US
dc.subject.stwStufenflexibilitäten_US
dc.subject.stwKorruptionsbekämpfungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleCan the exchange rate regime influence corruption?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn671799355en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
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