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dc.contributor.authorGürtler, Marcen
dc.contributor.authorGürtler, Oliveren
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-11-
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-18T08:28:05Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-18T08:28:05Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.pidoi:10.2139/ssrn.2031582en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57177-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze the interaction of explicit and implicit contracts in a model with selfish and fair principals. Fair principals are willing to honor implicit agreements, whereas selfish principals are not. Principals are privately informed about their types. We investigate a separating equilibrium in which principals reveal their type through the contract o er to the agent. If this equilibrium is played, explicit and implicit contracts are substitutes. Since the agent learns the principal's type, a selfish principal has to rely on explicit incentives. A fair principal, by contrast, can effectively induce implicit incentives and hence does not need to use explicit incentives. Interestingly, if a selfish principal can rely on more effective explicit incentives, a fair principal becomes more likely to be able to separate from the selfish type and, hence, to make better use of implicit incentives. In this sense, there is a strategic complementarity between explicit and implicit incentives.en
dc.language.isogeren
dc.publisher|aTechnische Universität Braunschweig, Institut für Finanzwirtschaft |cBraunschweigen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper Series |xIF38V1en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelD86en
dc.subject.jelM52en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordexplicit contractsen
dc.subject.keywordimplicit contractsen
dc.subject.keywordseparating equilibriumen
dc.subject.keywordsubstitutesen
dc.subject.keywordstrategicen
dc.subject.keywordcomplementarityen
dc.titleThe interaction of explicit and implicit contracts: A signaling approach-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn689985908en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:tbsifw:IF38V1en

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