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Technische Universität Braunschweig >
Institut für Finanzwirtschaft, Technische Universität Braunschweig >
Working Paper Series, Institut für Finanzwirtschaft, TU Braunschweig >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57177
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Gürtler, Marc | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Gürtler, Oliver | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-04-11 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-04-18T08:28:05Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2012-04-18T08:28:05Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2012 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.pi | | doi:10.2139/ssrn.2031582 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57177 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We analyze the interaction of explicit and implicit contracts in a model with selfish and fair principals. Fair principals are willing to honor implicit agreements, whereas selfish principals are not. Principals are privately informed about their types. We investigate a separating equilibrium in which principals reveal their type through the contract o er to the agent. If this equilibrium is played, explicit and implicit contracts are substitutes. Since the agent learns the principal's type, a selfish principal has to rely on explicit incentives. A fair principal, by contrast, can effectively induce implicit incentives and hence does not need to use explicit incentives. Interestingly, if a selfish principal can rely on more effective explicit incentives, a fair principal becomes more likely to be able to separate from the selfish type and, hence, to make better use of implicit incentives. In this sense, there is a strategic complementarity between explicit and implicit incentives. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | ger | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Institut für Finanzwirtschaft, Technische Universität Braunschweig Braunschweig | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Working papers, Institut für Finanzwirtschaft, Technische Universität Braunschweig IF38V1 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D82 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D86 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | M52 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | explicit contracts | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | implicit contracts | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | separating equilibrium | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | substitutes | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | strategic | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | complementarity | | en_US |
| dc.title | | The interaction of explicit and implicit contracts: A signaling approach | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 689985908 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.repec | | RePEc:zbw:tbsifw:IF38V1 | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Working Paper Series, Institut für Finanzwirtschaft, TU Braunschweig
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