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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57166
  

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dc.contributor.authorFünfgelt, Joachimen_US
dc.contributor.authorSchulze, Günther G.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-17T12:55:58Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-17T12:55:58Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57166-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze the formation of environmental policy to regulate transboundary pollution if governments are self-interested. In a common agency framework, we portray the environmental policy calculus of two political supportmaximizing governments that are in a situation of strategic interaction with respect to their environmental policies, but too small to affect world market prices. We show how governments systematically deviate from socially optimal environmental policies. Taxes may be too high if environmental interests and pollution-intensity of production are very strong; under different constellations they may be too low. Governments may actually subsidize the production of a polluting good. Politically motivated environmental policy thus may be more harmful to the environment as compared to the benevolent dictators' solution. In other cases it may enhance environmental quality and welfare beyond what a benevolent government would achieve.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv., Inst. für Volkswirtschaftslehre Lüneburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUniversity of Lüneburg Working Paper Series in Economics 196en_US
dc.subject.jelQ58en_US
dc.subject.jelF5en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordpolitical economyen_US
dc.subject.keywordenvironmental policyen_US
dc.subject.keywordtransboundary pollutionen_US
dc.subject.keywordcommon agencyen_US
dc.subject.keywordstrategic interactionen_US
dc.subject.stwUmweltpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwGrenzüberschreitende Umweltbelastungen_US
dc.subject.stwZwei-Länder-Modellen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleEndogenous environmental policy when pollution is transboundaryen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn654925712en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Working Paper Series in Economics, Leuphana Universität Lüneburg

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