Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56990 
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dc.contributor.authorBibow, Jörgen
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-14-
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-12T14:18:28Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-12T14:18:28Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56990-
dc.description.abstractCurrency market intervention-cum-reserve accumulation has emerged as the favored selfinsurance strategy in recipient countries of excessive private capital inflows. This paper argues that capital account management represents a less costly alternative line of defense deserving renewed consideration, especially in the absence of fundamental reform of the global monetary and financial order. Mainstream arguments in favor of financial globalization are found unconvincing; any indirect benefits allegedly obtainable through hot money inflows are equally obtainable without actually tolerating such inflows. The paper investigates the experiences of Brazil, Russia, India, and China (the BRICs) in the global crisis and subsequent recovery, focusing on their respective policies regarding capital flows.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aLevy Economics Institute of Bard College |cAnnandale-on-Hudson, NYen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x683en
dc.subject.jelF02en
dc.subject.jelF32en
dc.subject.jelF33en
dc.subject.jelF39en
dc.subject.jelG28en
dc.subject.jelO23en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordcapital flowsen
dc.subject.keywordself-insuranceen
dc.subject.keywordcapital controlsen
dc.subject.keywordfinancial regulationen
dc.titlePermanent and selective capital account management regimes as an alternative to self-insurance strategies in emerging-market economies-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn668286423en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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