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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56926
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| Title: | | The dark side of reciprocity  |
| Authors: | | Montinari, Natalia |
| Issue Date: | | 2011 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Jena economic research papers 2011,052 |
| Abstract: | | Whether friendship or competitive relationships deserve to be encouraged in the workplace is not obvious a priori. In this paper we derive the conditions under which a profit-aximizing employer finds it convenient to induce a rat race among workers exhibiting horizontal reciprocity in order to obtain underpaid or unpaid extra effort. We characterize the optimal compensation scheme under both symmetric and asymmetric information about workers' actions, and we also derive conditions for our result to hold in the presence of vertical reciprocity. |
| Subjects: | | extra effort horizontal reciprocity negative reciprocity |
| JEL: | | D03 D83 J33 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik
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