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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56924
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| Title: | | Competitive problem solving and the optimal prize schemes  |
| Authors: | | Suzuki, Toru |
| Issue Date: | | 2010 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Jena economic research papers 2010,083 |
| Abstract: | | Agents compete to solve a problem. Each agent knows own computational capacity as private information and simultaneously chooses either a risky or a safe problem solving method. This paper analyzes the optimal prize schemes from the perspective of the prize designer who wishes to find a solution as quick as possible. It is shown that (i) the winner-take-all scheme can induce excessive risk taking and make problem solving slower (ii) prize schemes with milder competitive pressure induce the optimal risk taking and quicker problem solving. |
| Subjects: | | optimal prize scheme risk taking problem solving |
| JEL: | | D82 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik
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