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dc.contributor.authorSuzuki, Toruen_US
dc.description.abstractAgents compete to solve a problem. Each agent knows own computational capacity as private information and simultaneously chooses either a risky or a safe problem solving method. This paper analyzes the optimal prize schemes from the perspective of the prize designer who wishes to find a solution as quick as possible. It is shown that (i) the winner-take-all scheme can induce excessive risk taking and make problem solving slower (ii) prize schemes with milder competitive pressure induce the optimal risk taking and quicker problem solving.en_US
dc.publisherUniv. [u.a.] Jenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJena economic research papers 2010,083en_US
dc.subject.keywordoptimal prize schemeen_US
dc.subject.keywordrisk takingen_US
dc.subject.keywordproblem solvingen_US
dc.subject.stwÖkonomischer Anreizen_US
dc.titleCompetitive problem solving and the optimal prize schemesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Jena Economic Research Papers (2007-2014), Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik und Universität Jena

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