Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56916 
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-FeldWertSprache
dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werneren
dc.contributor.authorOtsubo, Hironorien
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-18-
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-11T09:31:37Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-11T09:31:37Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56916-
dc.description.abstractIn a situation, where it is efficient for one of two parties to pollute but highly inefficient if both parties do so, the harmed third party can freely impose its damage claims on both parties what crucially determines which equilibrium to expect. Whereas 'equality before the law' requires equal punishments, efficient equilibria are predicted when holding one party responsible and letting the other escape punishment. After discussing equilibrium selection for the game, we report on an experiment with two treatment variables: one that determines when the harmed party announces its potential damage claims and one varying a game- and justice-unrelated difference between the two culprits. According to our experimental data, 'equality before the law' dominates but is weakened by asymmetry in wealth and the possibility to announce sanctions.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena Economic Research Papers |x2011,046en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.jelK00en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordlaw and economicsen
dc.subject.keywordequality vs. efficiencyen
dc.subject.keywordequilibrium selectionen
dc.subject.keywordlaboratory experimentsen
dc.subject.stwUmwelthaftungen
dc.subject.stwRechtsdurchsetzungen
dc.subject.stwGrundrechten
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftliche Effizienzen
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichten
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleWhom to blame? An experiment of collective harming and punishing-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn670095680en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
378.38 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.