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dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werneren_US
dc.contributor.authorOtsubo, Hironorien_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-18en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-11T09:31:37Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-11T09:31:37Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56916-
dc.description.abstractIn a situation, where it is efficient for one of two parties to pollute but highly inefficient if both parties do so, the harmed third party can freely impose its damage claims on both parties what crucially determines which equilibrium to expect. Whereas 'equality before the law' requires equal punishments, efficient equilibria are predicted when holding one party responsible and letting the other escape punishment. After discussing equilibrium selection for the game, we report on an experiment with two treatment variables: one that determines when the harmed party announces its potential damage claims and one varying a game- and justice-unrelated difference between the two culprits. According to our experimental data, 'equality before the law' dominates but is weakened by asymmetry in wealth and the possibility to announce sanctions.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv. [u.a.] Jenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJena economic research papers 2011,046en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.jelK00en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordlaw and economicsen_US
dc.subject.keywordequality vs. efficiencyen_US
dc.subject.keywordequilibrium selectionen_US
dc.subject.keywordlaboratory experimentsen_US
dc.subject.stwUmwelthaftungen_US
dc.subject.stwRechtsdurchsetzungen_US
dc.subject.stwGrundrechten_US
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftliche Effizienzen_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleWhom to blame? An experiment of collective harming and punishingen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn670095680en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik

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